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USPTO Patent Bar (MPEP), Paralegal & E-Discovery Practice Test

AIA 35 U.S.C. 102/103/112 patentability, MPEP prosecution & PCT deadlines, FRCP civil procedure & evidence rules, EDRM/e-discovery spoliation, and legal ethics.

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40 questions in 48 minutes, drawn from every topic. No answers shown until the end, then a full score breakdown, your weakest topics and a review of what you missed.

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Sample questions

A defendant in federal district court files a pre-answer motion to dismiss solely under FRCP Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. After the court denies that motion, the defendant files an answer raising lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) for the first time. How must the court rule on the personal jurisdiction defense?

  1. It is waived under FRCP Rule 12(h)(1), because a Rule 12(b)(2) personal jurisdiction defense is forfeited if omitted from a defendant's initial pre-answer Rule 12 motion.
  2. It is preserved under FRCP Rule 12(h)(2), because lack of personal jurisdiction may be raised in any responsive pleading, a Rule 12(c) motion, or at trial on the merits.
  3. It is automatically preserved alongside subject-matter jurisdiction under FRCP Rule 12(h)(3), which allows jurisdictional challenges at any stage including appeal.
  4. It may be raised in the answer as a matter of right whenever the defendant files the answer within 21 days after the district court denies the Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
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A. It is waived under FRCP Rule 12(h)(1), because a Rule 12(b)(2) personal jurisdiction defense is forfeited if omitted from a defendant's initial pre-answer Rule 12 motion.

Under FRCP Rules 12(g)(2) and 12(h)(1), the four disfavored defenses—lack of personal jurisdiction (12(b)(2)), improper venue (12(b)(3)), insufficient process (12(b)(4)), and insufficient service of process (12(b)(5))—are waived if omitted from a party's first pre-answer Rule 12 motion. By contrast, failure to state a claim (12(b)(6)) is preserved through trial under Rule 12(h)(2), and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (12(b)(1)) can never be waived under Rule 12(h)(3).

Reference: FRCP Rules 12(b)(2), 12(b)(6), 12(g)(2), 12(h)(1)–(3)

On March 10, 2025, Dr. Lin publishes a peer-reviewed journal article fully describing her novel lithium-silicon battery anode. On January 20, 2026, she files a U.S. nonprovisional patent application claiming that exact anode, with no earlier priority claim. How does AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102 treat Dr. Lin's own March 10, 2025 publication?

  1. It bars patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) because the AIA converted the United States into an absolute-novelty jurisdiction with no grace period for inventor publications.
  2. It bars patentability unless Dr. Lin submits an affidavit of prior conception and diligence under 37 CFR 1.131(a) to swear behind the publication date.
  3. It is disqualified as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A) because it is an inventor disclosure made one year or less before the effective filing date.
  4. It is disqualified as prior art only if Dr. Lin filed a U.S. provisional application prior to the journal's peer-review submission date to establish prior invention.
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C. It is disqualified as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A) because it is an inventor disclosure made one year or less before the effective filing date.

Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A) (MPEP § 2153.01(a)), a disclosure made one year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed invention is not prior art under § 102(a)(1) if made by the inventor, a joint inventor, or another who obtained the disclosed subject matter directly or indirectly from the inventor. Rule 1.131(a) affidavits swearing behind prior art do not apply to AIA applications.

Reference: 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A); MPEP § 2153.01(a)

A citizen of Texas files a state-law breach-of-contract action in federal district court solely on diversity-of-citizenship grounds against a corporation incorporated in Delaware whose corporate headquarters and principal place of business are in Texas, seeking $120,000 in damages. Does federal diversity jurisdiction exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1332?

  1. Yes, because the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the defendant corporation's state of incorporation (Delaware) differs from the plaintiff's state of citizenship (Texas).
  2. Yes, because under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), minimal diversity between any one state of corporate citizenship and the opposing party satisfies federal diversity jurisdiction.
  3. No, because under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), the corporation is a citizen of both Delaware and Texas, destroying the complete diversity required with the Texas plaintiff.
  4. No, because federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 applies only to federal statutory claims exceeding $75,000 and never to purely state-law contract disputes.
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C. No, because under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), the corporation is a citizen of both Delaware and Texas, destroying the complete diversity required with the Texas plaintiff.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) and Strawbridge v. Curtiss, federal diversity jurisdiction requires both an amount in controversy strictly exceeding $75,000 (exclusive of interest and costs) and complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) and Hertz Corp. v. Friend, a corporation is a citizen of both its state of incorporation (Delaware) and its principal place of business/nerve center (Texas), destroying complete diversity with a Texas plaintiff.

Reference: 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), § 1332(c)(1); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010)

An examiner rejects independent Claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Reference A in view of Reference B, explaining that combining two known mechanical brackets according to known methods yields predictable structural rigidity. The applicant argues solely that the rejection is legally defective because neither Reference A nor Reference B contains an explicit written suggestion to combine them. How should the examiner evaluate this argument?

  1. Withdraw the rejection immediately, because establishing a prima facie case of obviousness under Graham v. John Deere strictly requires an explicit written teaching in the cited references.
  2. Maintain the rejection if the articulated rationale has a sound factual underpinning, because KSR v. Teleflex rejected rigid application of the teaching-suggestion-motivation test.
  3. Convert the rejection to a 35 U.S.C. § 102 anticipation rejection, because combining two references without an explicit cross-reference is permissible only under inherency principles.
  4. Suspend prosecution and require a third prior art reference demonstrating that a person of ordinary skill in the art had actually built the combined bracket before filing.
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B. Maintain the rejection if the articulated rationale has a sound factual underpinning, because KSR v. Teleflex rejected rigid application of the teaching-suggestion-motivation test.

Under Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (MPEP §§ 2141, 2143), obviousness is evaluated flexibly rather than through a rigid teaching-suggestion-motivation (TSM) test. An examiner may support a § 103 rejection without an express written suggestion in the references by articulating a rational underpinning, such as combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable results.

Reference: 35 U.S.C. § 103; KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); MPEP §§ 2141, 2143

In a $90,000 commercial contract lawsuit, the plaintiff demands forensic restoration and attorney review of 40 legacy backup tapes at an estimated cost of $250,000 to search for marginally relevant background emails. Under FRCP Rule 26(b)(1), what is the primary standard a federal court applies to limit this discovery request?

  1. Whether the requested legacy backup tapes are strictly admissible at trial under the Federal Rules of Evidence without any hearsay or authentication objections.
  2. Whether the discovery is proportional to the needs of the case, weighing factors including the amount in controversy and whether burden or expense outweighs likely benefit.
  3. Whether the requested emails are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, which remains the controlling scope test under current Rule 26(b)(1).
  4. Whether the responding party has already produced at least 10,000 pages of ESI, which automatically caps further electronic discovery under FRCP Rule 26(b)(1).
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B. Whether the discovery is proportional to the needs of the case, weighing factors including the amount in controversy and whether burden or expense outweighs likely benefit.

Under FRCP Rule 26(b)(1) (as amended in 2015), discovery is limited to nonprivileged matter relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, weighing six factors: importance of the issues, amount in controversy, relative access to information, parties' resources, importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether burden or expense outweighs likely benefit. The 2015 amendments deleted the 'reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence' phrase, and discoverable information need not be admissible.

Reference: FRCP Rule 26(b)(1)

Exams this helps with

ExamAgency / IssuerRegion
NALA Certified Paralegal (CP) Knowledge ExamNALAUnited States
NFPA Paralegal Advanced Competency Exam (PACE)NFPAUnited States
NCRA Registered Professional Reporter (RPR Written)NCRAUnited States
ACEDS Certified E-Discovery Specialist (CEDS)ACEDSGlobal / Online
USPTO Patent Bar Registration Exam (MPEP)USPTOUnited States